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Abstract
This essay offers replies to the critical commentaries on The
Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic presented by Kathleen M.
Higgins, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Mariana Ortega.  The essay
shows how the probing questions and criticisms that the three
commentators raise bring out details in the framework of
relationality, address, and promises through which the book
theorizes the aesthetic.
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The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic, for their spirited
engagement with which I thank Kathleen M. Higgins, Carolyn
Korsmeyer, and Mariana Ortega, highlights the ambivalence
the aesthetic assumes in everyday life and in the artworld,
historically as well as under contemporary, late capitalist social
formations.  The aesthetic, as I indicate here, activates its
ethical and political polyvalence in the fields of difference,
enjoyment, loss, connectedness, and violence to which
Higgins, Korsmeyer, and Ortega point. 
 
1. Singularity, race, the individual, and the social:  A
reply to Kathleen M. Higgins
I understand aesthetic theory as a form of narration,
interpretation, and concept-building that is embedded in
aesthetic life itself.  The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic
juggles several principal goals:  One, to theorize the aesthetic
in terms of what I take to be its three constituent notions,
those of relationality, address, and promising and, thereby, to
make a new case for its significance.  Two, to demonstrate the
fruitfulness of this conceptual framework in view of the task of
accounting for the entanglements of the aesthetic with
intersecting modalities of social difference and with the forms
of power these differences tie into.  Three, to show my three
key concepts at work in specific historical, quotidian, and
artistic cases.  Four, to fashion a style of investigation,
exposition, and writing that attests to our situatedness as
aesthetic theorists and agents in the mosaic of factors we
subject to inquiry.
The book seeks as far as possible to avoid projecting onto that
mosaic an overarching narrative that belies the multiplicity of
operative forces and that shortcuts the ongoing process of
reading that I consider key to critical cultural and transcultural
agency, given that we inhabit crosshatching modalities of
hierarchized difference that pop up in oppositions such as
those between reason and the body, the particular and the
general, the individual and the social.
My critique of Roland Barthes does not object to his
valorization of the punctum as such.  Though I recognize
problems with the punctum, I believe it involves an important
even if limited mode of apprehension.  My central point of
contention with Barthes is that his account of the punctum
fails to yield a satisfactory answer to the gendered problematic
of the detail.  What the gendered status of the detail in the
history of aesthetics, to my mind, demands, building on Naomi
Schor’s analysis and also on Barthes’s views,[1] is a dynamic
form of reading that plays out the detail against the whole, the
particular against the general, and the other way around.[2]
A mere celebration of specific kinds of detail, such as the
punctum, preserves intact a process of reverberating
hierarchies that take different forms in different situations.[3]
 In sum, the punctum is necessary to a rethinking of the place
of gender in aesthetics but it does not suffice.  Aesthetic
theory needs a more complicated revision than Barthes
achieves, one that alerts us to a slippery, tenacious, and
dispersed pattern of interlinking forces of masculinization and
feminization.  My issue is not with the punctum per se, which I
find highly valuable, even if it incurs problems.[4]  The
punctum, my main objection states, is inadequate to the
theoretical task of revising aesthetics in light of its gendered
deprecation of detail.
Although I argue that Arthur Danto disregards aspects of the
form and content of Botero’s work, in his review for The
Nation of the artist’s Abu Ghraib series (2004-06), my view is
not simply the one Higgins ascribes to me:  that it is Danto’s
“omissions [that] render ‘the Abu Ghraib oeuvre a proper item
for consumption by a proprietary, racialized, and nationalist
cultural sensibility.’”[5]  I show how Danto actively buys into
pejoratively racialized and racializing conceptual and affective
schemes pertaining to figurations of childishness,
repetitiveness, pathos, and marketability, as well as to
conceptions of the artworld, disturbatory art, and the Latin
American Baroque.  The denominations 'pathetic,' 'blimpy,'
'bland,' and '[not] serious' retain a resonance and weight in
Danto’s review that he never retracts.[6]
Danto’s framing of Botero’s work enacts a racially distanced
mode of reading.  In his remarks on the Abu Ghraib oeuvre, he
preserves a form of racial othering under the rubrics of
closeness, empathetic identification, and even praise.  The
art’s meaning does not rely on emotional effects to the extent
that Danto seems to argue.  This meaning includes dimensions
of artistic content that enjoy a certain independence from the
viewer’s affective response per se, elements that Danto
ignores.
Danto fails to adequately mark, in terms of stylistic and formal
features, how the Abu Ghraib series arrives at the power that
he attributes to it.  He is also unclear about the degree to
which he takes the series to be artistically strong. The works’
form and content give a specific contour to the affects they
elicit in the discerning viewer.  Danto downplays the formal
structuration of spectatorial response.  Thus he insufficiently
acknowledges the work for the specific work it is.  I do not
straightforwardly agree with Danto’s artistic verdict while
disputing omissions in his explanation; I challenge Danto’s
positioning of Botero’s work in a field of racialized aesthetic
discourse that is also a field of racial power.
In contrast to the reading Higgins suggests, I do not “demand
that the entire web of social relationships be kept in view in
every aesthetic analysis” (Higgins, Section 4). Concerning the
worry that The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic
overemphasizes the social nexus, it is worth observing that I
see the aesthetic at work as a dimension of race, gender, and
the political, just as I find politics and difference at work as
aspects of the aesthetic.  Rather than endorsing an exclusive
or narrow focus on social constellations, I thus develop an
expansive notion of aesthetically shaped and aesthetically
operative differences.
I do not claim that the aesthetic generally is the most
promising when it disrupts.  In light of the need to contest
established orders of aestheticized and aestheticizing
difference, such disruption is often crucial, however, at the
level of theory as well as practice.
An advantage of the term “affect,” in my view, visible in the
work of many so-called affect theorists, is that it recognizes
the fluidity and temporal arc of emotions and their
connectedness with perception, space, and collectivity.[7]
How much weight should we give to social difference?  This is
a vexing problem, and the reply varies for different situations.
 To quickly glance the polyvalent, contravening forces into
which social categorizations enter, it is worth recalling the
opening lines of Pat Parker’s poem, “For the white person who
wants to know how to be my friend:”
The first thing you do is to forget that i’m Black.
Second, you must never forget that i’m Black.[8]
Along with with artists, critical race feminist scholars have
probed the multivalence characterizing practices of social
classification.[9]  Yet, aesthetic theory has not given systemic
difference the emphasis it requires.  As aestheticians, we have
a responsibility to think through how our conceptual
frameworks construe questions of power.  This task remains.
 It demands that we pay attention to racial, gender, and class
context. 
Notions of race, class, gender, and the other categories of
difference with which they intersect do not, in my account,
most centrally denote group status but modalities of power
that shape identities, intersubjective relations, and a host of
collective forms and interactions.  Talk about race, class,
gender, and sexuality does not ignore individuals—we are
carriers of these dimensions.  Individual identities are not
neatly separable from these factors, even if such identities
clearly are not reducible to them.
2. Navigating interlinking promises and threats:  A reply
to Carolyn Korsmeyer
Carolyn Korsmeyer scrutinizes the important and difficult
dilemmas that arise when our moral values clash with our
desires for aesthetic enjoyment and with our values of
transhistorical and cross-cultural understanding.  Do we take
in stride what may be the faintly or even intensely
reprehensible enjoyment with which our engagements with
fiction would appear to be shot through?  Or do we opt to
foreclose possibilities for attaining insight and experience
across historical epochs and cultural boundaries by resisting
morally troubling narrative presuppositions and
seductions?[10]  Korsmeyer’s genre of potentially discreditable
enjoyment signals the moral compromise that may be the
price we pay for our delight and instruction.
The epistemic and moral pressures Korsmeyer highlights are
significant.  The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic develops
some considerations that are worth taking into account in
reflecting on them:  The moral and political ambivalence of the
aesthetic is endemic.  Ethically objectionable elements occur at
all levels of the aesthetically mediated structures of address
and relationality in which we participate.  They mark the
modes of address we handle on a daily basis, the texture of
relationships we navigate, and the repertoire of aesthetic
promises and threats we realize.[11]  I see Korsmeyer’s
species of reprehensible pleasures as a subcategory of a wide
range of aesthetic promises and threats, whereby, as I
indicate in the book, promises involve threats, and threats
promises, and both comprise forms of address.[12]
Regarding poet Randall Jarrell’s “gratuitous” and “jarring”
references to African people, I would want to point to the
entwinement of promises and threats:  I would want to
recognize the threat inherent in the promising “otherwise
sensitive poetic voice,” such as the threat of covering over
racial constructions, and to recognize the promise held out by
the threatening “then-conventional mode of address”
(Korsmeyer, Section 4), such as the promise of enforcing racial
configurations.
I am also curious about the tensions and collusions between
this promise and threat.  In the cases of Jarrell’s and Walter
Scott’s novels, promises of narrative enjoyment, of diachronic
cultural understanding, and, presumably, of moral uplift held
out by fiction, are cotemporaneous with threats of
compromising our moral sensibilities.  Likewise, in Jarrell’s and
Scott’s stories, judging from Korsmeyer’s account, black and
white women, black men, and male gypsies appear to be
construed as and invested with a whole gamut of aesthetic
threats and promises.  I would assume this assortment of
threats and promises to include threats of moral dissolution, of
existential bleakness, of an annihilation of white male control,
and of the unraveling of human civilization and form.  These
threats, I imagine, are accompanied by promises of alterity,
freedom, innocence, self-sacrifice, loyalty, speculative
discernment, and material interconnectedness.
Again, I am interested in the ways these different threats and
promises in the representation conspire and collide in the
passages Korsmeyer quotes.  Analogously, I would like to
attend to the threats and promises inherent in our reactions to
the representation.  The latter set, presumably, would include
the threat to morality, if we do not resist the relevant
construals of blacks, etc., as threats, the threat of
ethnocentrism, if we reject the portrayals too rigorously, and
even the threat of seeing or imagining gypsies as embodying
promises of freedom.  More generally, how do these kinds of
threats and promises structure our experience of the works
and organize our various identificatory and disidentificatory,
participatory and nonparticipatory pleasures and displeasures,
seductions and repulsions?
Letting go of a specific aesthetic promise does not mean
dropping the promise of the aesthetic altogether.  I would
therefore reject Korsmeyer’s suggestion that in situations
where sexism and racism get in the way of the comical, as
with the movie Mash, “the aesthetic . . . loses its power”
(Korsmeyer, Section 2).  Likewise, when moral resistance
overcomes enjoyment or appreciation, I do not believe that for
that reason “[t]he promise of the aesthetic,” as Korsmeyer
states, “is broken” (Korsmeyer, Section 3), and would want to
point to a more local breaking of a specific kind of aesthetic
promise that happens to be in effect.
The case of Mash seems to differ in this regard from that of
Clarice Lispector’s novel The Hour of the Star, which I discuss
in my final chapter.  This novel calls into question the promise
of culture attendant on the aesthetic generally, as Lispector
takes up the problem of the moral and political standing of
aesthetic existence as a problem of certain aesthetic threats
and promises, and edges the reader toward contemplating an
all-round dismissal of the cultural promise, while
simultaneously challenging us to construe that promise
anew.[13]
I am interested in Korsmeyer’s suggestion of a “dominant
address” in Casablanca “to freedom fighters, to anti-fascists,
to ordinary people trying to flee the dangers of war” that is
interrupted by protagonist Ilsa Lund’s (Ingrid Bergman’s)
reference to the black pianist, Sam (Dooley Wilson), as a
“boy” (Korsmeyer, Section 2).  I have reservations, however,
about neatly separating these two forms of address.  I see the
movie’s address to its public as qualified by Ilsa’s address
concerning Sam to a white interlocutor within the movie
(Captain Louis Renault, played by Claude Rains).  I experience
the scene as representative of a broader mode of address from
whites to whites and as an exemplification of a well-known
script of address that enlists blacks for white purposes.  On
this interpretation, the moment is paradigmatic of the film’s
positioning of freedom fighters and refugees as mainly white,
and of the movie’s splitting of its implied audience along
racially exclusionary lines, a positioning and partitioning for
which the centering of a white love triangle in North Africa
during World War II provides further evidence.[14]
By this reading I do not mean to suggest that address is a
one-dimensional phenomenon but to stress the inescapable
entwinement of aesthetic promises and threats in the world in
which we live.  Aesthetic address is not tidy.  As I put it in my
discussion of beauty, such address “is not ready to be set
aright; it never will be.”[15]
Korsmeyer notes that “if aesthetic enjoyment can mark the
fact that one’s imagination is captured by a fictional world, the
question becomes:  When does this phenomenon mask or
overcome values that would otherwise be in place?”
(Korsmeyer, Section 2).  This is a poignant and worthy
question.  The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic expands the
range of tenacious problems that these kinds of dilemmas
provoke:  How do the phenomena of coming into, being in, or
relinquishing the grip of a fiction play into constellations of
relationality, address, and promising that actually are in
place?[16]  What is the cultural efficacy of the divergent sorts
of enthrallment beholding us to fictional genres?  The latter
question rapidly branches out into a range of additional
questions I want to ask:  What do we make of the social
productivity of various kinds of aesthetic engagement, such as
the sustenance that Alice Walker’s mother is said to have
found in the growing of flowers, the racially exoticizing practice
bell hooks calls eating the other, or the marketing of racial
and gender differences in the form of “multicultural” Barbie
dolls, explored by Ann DuCille?[17]
Constellations of address and relationality sustain a wide range
of powers that shape the choices we face.  Options for
engagement or disengagement and resistance or submission
pervade these structures at multiple sites.  The framework of
promises, address, and relationality I describe in The Cultural
Promise of the Aesthetic helps us to identify and to qualify our
view of the different factors and forces that are at play in the
kinds of conundrums Korsmeyer stresses.  This framework
allows us to see the ambivalence that Korsmeyer signals as
endemic to aesthetic experience.
3. Love, plurality, and regulation:  A reply to Mariana
Ortega
Emphasizing the multiple forms and the complexity of the
presence of the aesthetic in the political and of the political in
the aesthetic, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic offers a
theory of the aesthetic.  It does not provide an assessment of
whether political or aesthetic values should prevail over each
other in specific cases or which particular commitments in a
nexus of interlacing concerns we should give the greatest
significance.  The book signals the imbrications of aesthetics
and politics.  It highlights the aesthetic stakes that we have in
political life and the political stakes in aesthetic life.  I engage
actual interventions, by theorists such as the poet and cultural
critic Audre Lorde, artists such as Botero, and quotidian
aesthetic agents, in fields of interactions.  But, for the most
part, I refrain from offering concrete recommendations for
turning systems of relationality and address in more adequate
moral, aesthetic, and political directions.
The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic underscores the ethical,
political, economic, and aesthetic need to rethink the place of
difference in aesthetics.  It argues for forms of address that
play out against each other the particular and the general as
well as the known and the unknown.  It implicitly supports the
worthiness of values of truthfulness, justice, aesthetic and
artistic goodness, critical agency and judgment, existential
flourishing, sociality, and pleasure.  It endorses, contests, and
revises critical agendas on particular points.  In doing so,
however, the book lays out parameters for reflection on how
we ought to act but stops short of outlining specific policies for
necessary social changes.  This is where strategies and
possibilities such as those of Lorde’s erotic, Gloria Anzaldúa’s
liminality, and María Lugones’s active subjectivity come in.  I
value their productivity, within limits.
The erotic, for Lorde, is a source of vital promises for women: 
it promises connectedness, selfhood, and power.  It makes a
space where what to many has seemed to be a threat, namely
women’s, and especially black women’s, erotic sensibilities,
becomes a promise.[18]  As Mariana Ortega notes, Lorde
believes the erotic can reduce the “threat of difference.”[19]
 But, in thinking about such threats and promises, it is
important to ask what is being promised or threatened to
whom.
While the removal of a threat of difference is apposite in
certain situations and can make possible much-needed
interconnections across social divisions, this strategy fails to
yield an adequate response to questions of difference in
aesthetics in general.  The aesthetic is a powerful contributor
to the commodification of difference by the tourist industry.  It
is at work in the exoticizing regime of erotic and sexual
consumption that hooks describes as “eating the other.”[20]
 Given these aestheticized erotic threats, I worry that a
general valorization of the erotic as an aesthetic response—a
promising one—to the threats of contemporary violence,
alienation, and a misrecognition or denial of difference
involves a glorification of practices that we should call into
question. 
Love is important to the aesthetic.[21]  This is perhaps most
influentially revealed in the case of Plato’s love of beauty,
truth, and goodness, and Barthes’ punctum.  The promise of
love, in these cases, goes together, however, with the threat
of the repulsive (a state that, as has been widely
acknowledged, is not necessarily unpromising or, for that
matter, unpleasurable).  My point, here, is that we need to
take seriously the ambivalence inherent in love and the erotic.
 Neither can resolve the moral, political, and aesthetic
difficulties of the aesthetic.  A generalized solution belies the
messiness of the field and inexorably displaces the problems it
purports to solve.[22]
The cultural promise of the aesthetic is not singular.  It is a
type of promise that subsumes a variety of promises.[23]  The
promise of an egalitarian and harmonious society that Pablo
Neruda attaches to our creation, interpretation, and
exchanging of everyday objects is an example of a cultural
promise that he takes the aesthetic to make.  Culture and the
aesthetic are sites of difference, antagonism, and rupture.
 They host multiple forms of collectivity, ones that vary in the
strength, structure, and plasticity of the bonds that they
imply.  For that reason, and in that sense, the “culture” and
“aesthetics” parts of the cultural promise of the aesthetic are
pluralized.
The plurality of promising and the heterogeneity of aesthetic
collectivity are of a piece with each other.  Promises promise
specific things to specific types of addressees.  They are
selective and imply inclusions and exclusions.[24]  This sort of
plurality stays clear of a liberal pluralism that places all kinds
of collectives on the same level in a vision of endless flow.
 Moral stances suffuse circuits of interaction but cannot be
posited in the abstract—that is, lifted from the aesthetic
positions, conditions and forms in which they inhere—to
circumscribe what aesthetic life is about. 
Aesthetic relationality is regulated.  It is institutionalized.  We
orchestrate it through forms such as museums, schools,
parties, design, fashion, and objects like vacuum cleaners,
uniforms, and cars.  I do not believe that in general we should
expect more predictability in our relations.[25]  We need to
challenge and foster sedimentations as well as flows,
depending on context.  Structure and contingency, system and
happenstance, the predictable and the volatile or the mercurial
are interrelated.  Rigid oppositions between pattern and detail,
the stable and the erratic, the ordinary and the extraordinary,
the normalized and the queer do not exist.  We have to work
in all of these registers at once and play them out against each
other.
Meanwhile, there is traction:  We count on promises and
threats.  They are are both stable and unstable.  They arise
within systems of relationality and address.[26]  These
systems exhibit regularity and contingency in good and bad
ways.  An aesthetic space where we are either not divided or
irrevocably divided is not available.  The challenge that arises
for us as aesthetic agents, then, is one of negotiating a field of
promises, threats, relationality, and address.  Showing how we
are invested in those negotiations, as I do, does not require
coming down on the ways we should carry them out in
particular situations.
The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic emphasizes constitutive
dimensions of aesthetic life.  Stipulating what is to be done
within those registers is a different matter.  Bringing attention
to structural operations does not require adjudicating how
these phenomena are to be weighed, even if careful judgments
necessitate paying heed to those factors.  This is where the
aesthetic and political commitments of agents and collectives
enter the scene.
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proclivities to reproduce problematic differences and
hierarchies.  Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic,
pp. 117-118, 146.  The oppressing-resistance dynamic that
Lugones stresses resonates with my view of interlacing
promises and threats, and with my emphasis throughout the
book on the embeddedness of critical agents in the very
formations of aesthetic relationality and address that they
critically resist.  For this latter point, see, for example, pp. 28,
84, 104, 115-116, 127-128, 226 note 47, 233 note 42.  On
active subjectivity and the oppression-resistance relation
specifically, see also this last note (233 note 42).
[23] Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic, 
pp. 26, 204. 
[24] See Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic, pp.
28, 204-205, for examples of passages that speak to the
points just mentioned.
[25] Yet I find sharper environmental measures, constraints on
the profit-magnifying behaviors of banks and companies, and
checks on racial violence, on intolerance toward undocumented
workers, and on bigotry toward immigrants direly needed.  On
regulation, see Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic,
e.g., pp. 28, 198, 203.
[26] Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic, pp. 23-
27, 203-205. 
